

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 04125 01 OF 02 091403Z

47

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14

OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 EB-11 AECE-00 DRC-01 /148 W

----- 090787

O R 091237Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2705

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 4125

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TEXT OF NAC GUIDANCE FOR AD HOC GROUP

REF: (A) VIENNA 4107; (B) USNATO 2511; (C) USNATO 2512;
(D) USNATO 2513

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER REVIEWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT
GUIDANCE TO AD HOC GROUP AND RECEIVING REPORTS OF SPC
MEETING IN REFTELS, DELEGATION HAS SOME FURTHER SUG-
GESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE INCORPORATION IN WASHINGTON
GUIDANCE TO USNATO FOR MAY 10 SPC MEETING. THESE ARE LISTED BELOW.
END SUMMARY.

2. READING USNATO REPORT OF SPC DISCUSSION HAS REIN-
FORCED OUR BELIEF THAT THE IS PAPER SHOULD BE EXPANDED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 04125 01 OF 02 091403Z

TO INCLUDE THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF

VIENNA 4107. THIS PROPOSED LANGUAGE SHOULD BE IMPROVED BY AMENDING THE FIRST SENTENCE TO MAKE MORE CLEAR THAT THE ENTIRE MATERIAL IN SECTIONS II OF V OF IS DRAFT NEED NOT BE USED LITERALLY WITH THE EAST AT THE OUTSET. TO THIS END, THE FIRST SENTENCE OF OUR PROPOSED TEXT SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS: "IN ORALLY INDICATING TO THE EAST THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THESE STEPS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD USE GENERAL LANGUAGE IN DRAWING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW." SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE AMENDED TO DROP OUT PHRASE "THE FIRST PART OF." WE ALSO RECOMMEND THE ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE AT THE END OF THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE: "THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD DETERMINE THE TACTICS AND SEQUENCE OF PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF THE ITEMS BELOW." IN THE EVENT OF STRONG ALLIED PRESSURE TO DO SO, IT WOULD FROM OUR VIEWPOINT BE ACCEPTABLE TO ADD THE FOLLOWING PHRASE TO THIS SENTENCE: "ITEM IV, ASSURANCES TO THE OTHER SIDE REGARDING THE SECOND PHASE, SHOULD PROBABLY BE THE LAST ITEM TO BE ADVANCED."

3. TIME BETWEEN TWO PHASES. DELEGATION ENDORSES MISSION RECOMMENDATION IN FAVOR OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE LANGUAGE FOR ITEM II.

4. ITEM III, NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT.

WE MUCH PREFER OUR WORKING IN POINT 1 OF PARAGRAPH 9 OF VIENNA 4107 AND RECOMMEND ITS USE. IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO CHANGE PRESENT WORDING, WE SUGGEST ADDING THE PHRASE "OR FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, WHICHEVER IS SHORTER" TO THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF ITEM III. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS ITEM BE DELETED BECAUSE IT APPEARS TO IMPOSE THE CONDITION THAT ALL OF THE DETAILS LISTED IN THIS ITEM BE MENTIONED TO THE EAST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH FIRST DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE. IF DROPPING THE SENTENCE DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE, WE SUGGEST ADDING THE WORDS "FORMULATION OF" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SENTENCE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 04125 01 OF 02 091403Z

5. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF SECTION III, WE WOULD URGE THE DELETION OF THE WORD "PERMANENTLY" IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF III(A): AN ADVERB OF THIS KIND DOES NOT SERVE THE DESIRED PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GREATER CLARITY BUT RATHER COULD SERVE AS A PRETEXT FOR BAD FAITH EVASION.

6. WITH REGARD TO THE DURATION OF THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT, TREATED BOTH IN THE LEAD-IN PARAGRAPH OF ITEM III AND IN PARAGRAPH (E), WE BELIEVE THAT THIS DURATION PROVISION SHOULD BE INTRINSIC TO THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND SEPARATE FROM ANY PROVISION PROVIDING FOR TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. THIS IS IN ORDER TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE POSSIBILITY OF TERMINATION OF A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT DID NOT FUNCTION, AS WE INTEND IT SHOULD, AS AN INDUCEMENT FOR THE EAST TO COMPLETE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, OR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE EAST COULD SIMPLY PROTRACT THE PERIOD OF EFFECTIVENESS OF A WESTERN NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT BY DRAWING OUT THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT HAVING THE INTENTION OF CONCLUDING THEM. AN ENDURING LIMITATION ON WESTERN FORCES IS PRESUMABLY ONE OF THE MAJOR EASTERN OBJECTIVES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO RETAIN MAXIMUM CONTROL OVER IT AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE EAST IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A PERIOD OF VALIDITY OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT LONGER THAN THE DURATION OF A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON NON-INCREASE OF FORCES. THE SOVIETS WILL ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES NOT TO EXCEED A CERTAIN FORCE LEVEL AND THAT IT IS INEQUITABLE FOR THE WESTERN COMMITMENT TO BE OF SHORTER POTENTIAL DURATION THAN THE ONE WHICH THEY ARE REQUIRED TO UNDERTAKE. HOWEVER, IF THIS LOGIC IS FOLLOWED AS IT MAY HAVE TO BE, LIMITING THE DURATION OF THE MAIN AGREEMENT TO A PERIOD OF 3 YEARS WOULD IN OUR VIEW PLACE THE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS UNDER UNDUE PRESSURE TO COMPLETE THE PHASE II AGREEMENT. FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND OF THE PROVISION PERMITTING TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 04125 01 OF 02 091403Z

TO BE THE SAME AND SHOULD BE 5 YEARS OR THE COMPLETION OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER. WE RECOMMEND THAT USNATO BE AUTHORIZED TO PRESS FOR A 5-YEAR PERIOD FOR THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND TO USE THE REASONING ABOVE.

7. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION III(G) BE AMENDED TO SUBSTITUTE THE WORD "FORMULATING" FOR THE WORD "PRESENTING." BRINGING IN THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE FROM THE OUTSET, AT A POINT WHEN WE ONLY WISH TO APPRISE THE SOVIETS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT, WOULD DIMINISH THE EFFECT OF THE ALLIED STEP AND NEEDLESSLY COMPLICATE THE ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT, IT SEEMS PROBABLE TO US THAT THE ACTUAL FORMULATION OF A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD FALL IN THE SAME TIME FRAME AS FORMULATION OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION, WHERE THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE CAN BE BETTER HANDLED.

8. WITH REGARD TO ITEM IV, ASSURANCES TO THE OTHER
SIDE REGARDING A SECOND PHASE, SPC DISCUSSION AND

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 04125 02 OF 02 091355Z

47

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14

OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 EB-11 AECE-00 DRC-01 /148 W

----- 090694

O R 091237Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2706

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USNATO PRIORITY 1605

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 4125

FROM US REP MBFR

DISCUSSION HERE WITH UK AND FRG REPS INDICATES ALLIED
SENSITIVITY TO THE FORM OF THE COMMITMENT INVOLVED,
PARTICULARLY TO THE STATEMENT IN OUR PROPOSED TEXT THAT "THERE
COULD BE A PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD
MAKE THIS CLEAR." FOR THESE REASONS AND
FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESENTATION, WE RECOMMEND
SUBSTITUTE LANGUAGE ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 9(4)
OF VIENNA 4107. THE FRG ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE IN THE
PRESENT TEXT OF ITEM IV IS INEFFECTIVE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF GIVING CLEAR INDICATION TO
THE SOVIETS THAT THERE WOULD BE FRG AND ALSO UK
REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. THE COMPROMISE
FORMULA CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF USNATO 2511 IS

ALSO INADEQUATE IN THIS REGARD: "PRELIMINARY THINKING"
IS A WEAK SIGNAL. ALTHOUGH, AS IS ALREADY MANIFEST,
THE ALLIES WILL PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY ON THIS MATTER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 04125 02 OF 02 091355Z

AND PROBABLY PRESENT IT AT THE END OF THE SEQUENCE,
WE WISH TO BE IN A POSITION TO INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS
WHEN THE TIME COMES THAT THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A
COMMITMENT REPEAT COMMITMENT THAT PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD INCLUDE
FORCES OF ALL NATO NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
ANYTHING LESS WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF GAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO POSTPONING WESTERN
EUROPEAN, INCLUDING FRG, REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND PHASE
AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LEAVING THIS ISSUE ON CENTER
STAGE, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE POSSIBLE DISCOMFORTURE OF THE FRG. IF SHOULD
BE NOTED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT BE CITED, BOTH UK AND FRG
REPS HERE HAVE INDICATED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT THEY CONSIDER
THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 9(4)
OF VIENNA 4107 ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF THEIR INTERESTS.

9. WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE POINTS TO BE MADE
TO THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE AT THE OUTSET NOT REPEAT
NOT INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THE COMPLICATED ISSUE OF THE
FORM IN WHICH THE COMMITMENT WILL BE MADE. ULTIMATELY,
WE BELIEVE, THE SOVIET POSITION MAY MAKE IT NECESSARY
TO INCLUDE AN ACTUAL PROVISION TO THIS EFFECT IN THE
TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THIS POINT NEED NOT
BE RESOLVED NOW AMONG THE ALLIES ON A THEORETICAL
BASIS, BUT CAN BE LEFT TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS FOR
DETERMINATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CONSIDER
FRG VIEWS ABOUT A COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE STATEMENT TO BE
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST WHEN WE DO MOVE ON TO
FORMULATION AND FOR THAT REASON DO NOT BELIEVE THEY
SHOULD BE GIVEN ANY ENCOURAGEMENT.

10. WITH REGARD TO ITEM V, WITHDRAWAL PROVISION,
WE RECOMMEND USE OF THE LANGUAGE IN VIENNA 4107, PARA-
GRAPH 9(3). OUR FORMULATION HAS THE ADVANTAGE (A)
THAT IT SPEAKS OF "TERMINATION" RATHER THAN "WITH-
DRAWAL;" WE WOULD NOT LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION WHERE
THE USSR HAD "WITHDRAWN" FROM AN AGREEMENT BUT NATO CONTINUED
BOUND BY ITS OBLIGATIONS. (B) OUR LANGUAGE DOES NOT PREJUDGE
THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD BE PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT OTHER
THAN THE USSR. WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT THE REASONS WHY WE
CONSIDER A 5-YEAR PERIOD TO BE DESIRABLE. WHILE WE HAVE NO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 04125 02 OF 02 091355Z

OBJECTION TO A PROVISION FOR GIVING PRIOR NOTICE
OF A DECISION TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT A YEAR IN ADVANCE,
WHICH MIGHT MEET UK INTERESTS, THE UK ALTERNATE FORMULATION OF
THIS ITEM IS INADEQUATE
FOR ITS NEGOTIATING PURPOSE, WHICH IS TO DEMONSTRATE
TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PLACED AT
AND ENDURING DISADVANTAGE IF IT HAD UNDERTAKEN COMMIT-
MENTS IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND A PHASE II AGREEMENT
FAILED TO MATERIALIZE.

11. WITH REGARD TO BELGIAN RECOMMENDATIONS THAT
THIS ITEM BE DELETED AND THE ISSUE STUDIES FURTHER,
IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT WE NEED TO BE IN A
POSITION TO MAKE THIS POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE IF
WE HOPE TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PHASING. WITHOUT
IT, WE HAVE NO ARGUMENT WHICH COULD BE USED TO MEET
FREQUENT SOVIET POINTS THAT THE WESTERN COMMITMENT
TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION GIVES ABSOLUTELY
NO ASSURANCES THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE
AN ACTUAL OUTCOME; THUS POTENTIALLY LEAVING THE
SOVIET UNION IN A SITUATION WHERE IT HAD REDUCED ITS
FORCES BUT WHERE THERE WOULD BE NO REDUCTION IN THE GERMAN
FORCES, WHICH IS THE MAJOR SOVIET INTEREST IN THIS
REGARD. THE BELGIAN CONCERN IN ANY CASE MAY RELATE
TO THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD BE SIGNATORIES TO
A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THIS WOULD BE MET BY A
DELETION OF THE REFERENCE TO THE U.S. IN THE PRESENT
WORDING.HUMES

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, AGREEMENT DRAFT, FIVE YEAR PLAN, TROOP REDUCTIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA04125
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740113-0091
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740559/aaaacayo.tel
Line Count: 307
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) VIENNA 4107; (B) USNATO 2511; (C,) USNATO 2512;
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <07 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: TEXT OF NAC GUIDANCE FOR AD HOC GROUP
TAGS: PARM, CK, UK, GE, NATO, SPC
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005